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I study the influence of not-for-profit entities in companies, through shareholders 
proposals in the U.S. largest companies. This paper analyzes the not-for-profit entities 
involved, the issues addressed by the proposals and the financial characteristics of target 
companies, as well as market reactions and voting outcomes. Results indicate that not-
for-profit entities tend to target companies with higher profitability and value more 
frequently than general investors. Furthermore, the voting outcome is influenced by  
insider ownership and types of proposals. Finally, market reactions change with 
profitability, leverage, ownership structure and types of proposals. 
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1. INTRODUCTION  
Shareholders can express their opinions and try to influence a firm by submitting 
proposals to be voted at shareholders meetings. General meetings are held every year 
and gather the directors and the shareholders of the company. The proposals submitted 
require fifty percent of the votes from the shareholders in their meeting to win a 
majority vote. Managers advise shareholders to vote for or against each proposal. 
According to Institutional Shareholder Services (ISS) 2011, in 2010, companies 
consider that their engagements with shareholders have increased. Financial press 
reports that a significant number of nonprofit institutions (NPIs) participates in 
shareholders meetings (Gogoi 2011, Crosby 2000). These organizations do not exist 
primarily to generate profits and do not issue share capital or distribute their surplus by 
shareholders, founders or board members. According to 1993 System of Nation 
Accounts (SNA), they are also separate from government, self-governing and non-
compulsory. The most common type of non-for-profit institutions are religious 
congregations, trade and labor unions, trade and professional associations, public arts 
and political organizations, foundations and social and sports clubs. The United Nations 
(2003) states that NPIs constitute a significant and growing economic force in the U.S. 
and in several countries throughout the world. This paper tries to answer the following 
question: do nonprofit investors actively monitor firms?  
Previous papers illustrate the influence of shareholders proposals in corporate 
governance (Renneboog and Szilagyi 2011, Noe 2002, Almazan et al. 2005) but none 
studied the proposals of NPIs. Thus, nothing is known about what the proposals are 
about, whether they are approved, and if they influence the actions taken by companies.  
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My study of the participation of non profits in the general meetings begins with 
a characterization of the entities involved and their proposals. I perform an event study 
to test whether shareholders proposals from non profits cause a market reaction. Given 
that these proposals can be seen as disciplinary mechanisms, I expect to find a 
significant market reaction. I also perform statistic tests to assess for differences in 
market reactions between shareholders proposals’ sponsors and voting outcomes. 
Therefore, I compare, on one hand the target companies of not-for-profit institutions 
with target companies of other type of investors, and on the other hand, the companies 
that have approved proposals with the ones that have only not approved proposals. 
I find that a substantial number of proposals in 2009 is submitted by non-for-
profit institutions. These proposals are related to several issues, but most of them are 
about advisory vote in executive compensation. The event study indicates that the stock 
market reaction is higher after the proxy and meeting dates than before those dates. 
While the cumulative abnormal returns around the proxy date are positive, there is no 
evidence that abnormal returns around the meeting date are positive or nonzero. By 
comparing the target companies of non-for-profit institutions with other type of 
investors, I find that the first ones tend to have higher book-to-market ratio, return on 
assets, EPS growth and market capitalization. 
About the models, the results suggest that the percentage of votes for the 
proposals tends to be higher in companies with lower percentage of insider ownership. 
For six types of proposals both voting outcome and probability of being approved vary. 
About the stock price reaction around proxy date, it is negatively related to profitability, 
leverage and percentage of institutional ownership of companies. The dummy variables 
for cumulative voting and food insecurity influence the CARs around the proxy date 
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too. Besides the variables that influence the returns around the announcement date, the 
percentage of insider ownership and majority vote are also negatively related with the 
abnormal returns surrounding the shareholders meeting date. Furthermore other type of 
proposals, namely credit card practices and equity compensation retention, cause 
different market reactions around meeting date.  
This paper offers new evidence about the not-for-profit’s proposals. My study 
highlights the actively participation of this type of investors in shareholders meetings, 
that have never been investigated before. My paper contributes to the debate of 
shareholder activism, on which type of companies non-for-profit entities tend to submit 
proposals, summarizing the main differences from the target companies of other 
investors. 
In line with other papers, I examine the outcomes in terms of stock price impact 
and voting success. Contributing to the literature, I use indicators for valuation, 
profitability, growth, size, leverage and ownership structure. In addition to the effect of 
these indicators, I study the possible impact of the different type of proposals in 
dependent variables (% of votes in favor and CARs).  
2. LITERATURE REVIEW 
There are plenty of studies which analyze the role of shareholders in corporate 
governance. These articles discuss the influence of several types of shareholders in 
different areas of an organization, in different periods of time, and in several countries. 
Gillan and Starks (2003) mention the evolution of shareholder activism in general (also 
in the United States) and analyze the evidence provided by several empirical studies on 
the effects of shareholder activism.  The authors highlight the difficulty of establishing a 
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causal relationship between activism and the changes in the business activities of 
companies. Furthermore, by analyzing different types of shareholders and proposals, 
Gillan and Starks (2000) argue that activism of non-coordinated groups has been 
ineffective in the United States. They observe the voting outcomes and short-term 
market reactions for the different types of proposals and sponsor identity. Thomas and 
Cotter (2007) find evidence for a higher number of proposals and level of support from 
shareholders in the period between 2002-2004 than in earlier periods in the U.S..  
Akhigbe et al. (1997) find evidence confirming that firms benefit from increased 
monitoring, as a result of shareholder activism. Karpoff et al. (1996) report that poorly 
prior performed companies tend to attract proposals. Noe (2002) adds that strategic 
investors monitor management in an effectively and profitably way. Finally, Sjöström 
(2009) proposes that shareholders can be seen as norm entrepreneurs, given that they 
use their ownership to change norms. 
Wen (2009), Sjöström (2008 and 2009), Proffitt and Spicer (2006), Frantz and 
Instefjord (2007), Tkac (2006) and Guay et al. (2004) are examples of recent studies 
which analyze the actions undertaken by shareholders in order to influence a company’s 
corporate social responsibility. Wen (2009) and Proffitt and Spicer (2006) concentrate 
their analysis in institutional investors’ activism, revealing a growing awareness of 
social responsible investments of this type of investors. Proffitt and Spicer (2006), 
Sjöström (2008) and Tkac (2006) point out that religious groups were the most active 
investors in the field of corporate social responsibility in the US. Tkac (2006) 
distinguishes other groups, like social organizations and socially responsibility mutual 
funds, and studies the social activism via shareholders proposals. She concludes that 
forty to forty-five percent of the proposals submitted between 1992 and 2002 by these 
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groups were withdrawn. However, the types of investors and proposals are not the only 
determinant of the voting results. Renneboog and Szilagyi (2011) study shareholder-
initiated proxy proposals and find that both the voting outcomes and the announcement 
period stock price effects are affected by governance quality. Gifford (2010) defines 
high levels of power, legitimacy and urgency and the target company managers as the 
most significant factors that contribute to shareholder salience in improving 
environmental, social and corporate governance performance of investee company. 
Ertimur et al. (2010) find significantly that implementation decision varies with 
shareholders pressure and type of proposals. 
Recent literature reports on the relationship between shareholder activism and 
compensation within the companies. This is because according to Dodd-Frank Act 
(2011, US), publicly traded firms must let shareholders get a regular (but not binding) 
vote on executive pay packages, or a “say on pay”. Ertimur et al. (2011) argue that 
activists target firms with higher levels of CEO compensation. They defend that in 
companies where CEO payment is excessive, voting support on advisory vote proposals 
is higher. Ferri and Sandino (2009) explore the expensing of employee stock options. 
They find evidence proving that in companies where shareholders proposals related to 
this expense were submitted, the CEO compensation decreased. In June 2011, CFO 
publishes an article about the increased power given to shareholders in the last years 
through, for example, the Dodd-Frank Act. Companies are giving more attention about 
what investors want. However, they fear that a no vote on executive pay packages will 




3. SAMPLE AND DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS 
I use information about the proposals of 190 of the largest firms in the S&P500 
Index, this was hand-collected from the 2009 proxy statements.
1
 Given that the capital 
of the largest US firms is highly dispersed, there is a substantial number of shareholders 
making proposals. Furthermore, due to their size, these firms have a high importance in 
the economy. Financial data comes from Compustat and market data is retrieved from 
CRSP. 
Table 1 reports the type of proposals submitted by non-for-profit entities in the 
sample firms in 2009. The most frequent type of proposal is the one about advisory vote 
on compensation of executives (17 out of a total of 47 proposals, with a participation of 
24 out of a total of 78 not-for-profit institutions). Next are health care principles (5 
proposals and 7 NPIs) and political contributions and expenditures (4 proposals and 4 
NPIs). Although the proposals about weapons in space are not one of the most frequent 
type (3 proposals), are those which involve more NPIs (19). In 2009, twenty four 
percent of the proposals related to advisory vote on executive compensation were 
approved. However, overall, less than nine per cent of the proposals submitted by non-
profit institutions obtained the majority of votes in the annual shareholders meeting.  
Table 2 summarizes the entities that submitted more than one proposal, or whose 
proposals were approved in 2009. Only fifty seven out of the eighty one entities (70%) 
are in these conditions.  Table 3 presents the percentage of votes for the proposals in the 
general meetings of the firms, after I have eliminated those that have little support from 
the shareholders. Companies with a mean of votes for the proposals (submitted by 
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 I would like to gratefully acknowledge to Bernardo Maltez for provide me these data. 
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nonprofit institutions) lower than thirty per cent were cut off from the table. Again, it 
can be noted that the advisory vote on executive compensation’s proposals are the only 
that were approved in 2009, by getting fifty-one percent of the votes for in Cisco, 
Honeywell International, and Yum! Brands and fifty-seven percent of the votes in 
Valero energy.  The last column indicates that this issue has the greatest support from 
shareholders, with an average of forty six percent of votes in favor. I manually check 
that many of the proposals reproved in 2009 were repeated in 2010 annual meetings (28 
of 43). Almost all of the replicate proposals get higher percentage of support in 2010 
and five of them, (or 18%), were approved. This was in the following firms/topics: 
Apple, Allstate, Colgate-Palmolive and EMC about advisory vote and for McKesson 
about death benefits.   
Then I analyze the market reactions to proposals by using two event windows of 
three days. The event study estimate the short-term stock price impact of the thirty five 
proposals of non profits by calculating cumulative abnormal returns (CARs) around the 
proxy and the meeting dates.
2
 The  proxy date is the date of the first announcement of 
the proposals, when the proxy statement for annual meeting of shareholders general 
information were first sent and given to them, with the proposals description and the 
invitation for the event. The meeting date is the date of the annual shareholders meeting. 
The CARs are calculated using a market model to estimate the expected returns 
of CRSP’s value weighted. For each of the two events I analyze the CARs of three 
different windows: [-1, 0], [-1, 1] and [0, 1].
3
 Table 4 reports descriptive statistics on the 
CARs around the proxy date in Panel A and around the meeting date in Panel B. 
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 From now on I consider the 35 companies that receive proposals from NPIs institutions, instead of the 
47 proposals submitted by them and the 78 NPIs institutions  
3
 The cumulative of abnormal returns are also calculated for other event windows, but those do not differ 
qualitatively from the presented 
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Without huge differences between them, the [-1, 0] CARs have a mean of 0.009 and -
0.003 and a median of 0.004 and -0.002, [-1, 1] get a mean of 0.013 and -0.005 and a 
median of 0.002 and -0.002 and [0,1] take a mean of 0.012 and -0.001 and a median of 
0.003 and -0.001 around the proxy and the meeting date, respectively. This shows that a 
higher reaction of stock price exists after the proxy and the meeting dates than before 
those dates, as defended by Renneboog and Szilagyi (2011). 
Untabulated results show that the CARs around the date of the proxy are 
statistically positive (with a 10% confidence level) and CARs around the meeting date 
are not statistically different from zero. 
 Table 5 presents the means of [-1, 1] CARs of companies that had a proposal of 
each type from a not-for-profit company, during 2009. The proposals targeting health 
care principles have the strongest stock price effect around the proxy date, with the 
higher CARs mean (0.065).
4
 Curiously, the proposals related to executive 
compensation, despite of having the highest percentage of support in shareholders 
meetings, are not the ones that have the highest CARs mean. Proposals related to 
director expertise have the lowest CARs mean (-0.048). Around the meeting date, 
cumulative voting and non-addictive brands have the lowest cumulative abnormal 
returns. The proposals related to health care principles, and military sales to foreign 
governments have the most positively reaction of the market.
5
 Overall, the effect of the 
type of proposal in the CARs seems to be higher around the meeting date than around 
the proxy data. 
                                                          
4
 Submitting proposals about health care, shareholders request that the Board of Directors adopt principles 
for comprehensive health care principles. For example, they defend that health care coverage should be 
universal, continuous, and affordable to individuals and families.  
5
With the proposals related military sales to foreign governments, shareholders urge the Board of 
Directors to provide, a comprehensive report, of companies’ Industries’ foreign sales of military and 
weapons-related products and services. 
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I analyze the different stock price reactions in the companies at which at least 
one proposal receives the majority of votes in the shareholders meetings and the ones 
that did not get it. In order to study the difference in mean, median and variances 
between the two samples, Table 6 presents descriptive statistics and Table 7 performs 
some statistical tests. Table 6 indicates that the market reacts negatively to the proposals 
which won majority. All these proposals are related to advisory vote in executive 
compensation. This is consistent with findings of Karpoff et al. (1996), that the average 
of cumulative abnormal returns for these proposals, around the proxy date, is negative. 
They suggest that compensation-related proposals destroy value and hamper operations. 
For the proposals which do not cast the majority of votes, the cumulative abnormal 
returns have a positive, but insignificant, mean for almost all of the event windows 
around the two events. Renneboog and Szilagyi (2011) find the same result for 
proposals that failed to achieve the majority of votes between 1996 and 2005. They 
consider that market incorrectly anticipate which proposals will be approved.    
By performing the parametric tests (cross-sectional t-test and z-test) in Table 7, I 
find significant evidence about the difference in means for the windows [-1, 1] and [0, 
1] between the two samples (approved and not approved) around the first announcement 
of proposals. Around the meeting date the windows [-1, 0] and [-1, 1] register 
significant differences between the mean of cumulative abnormal returns. Assuming 
unequal variance between the groups and using a Fisher test, I find evidence about the 
differences in variance for the last sample. Finally, with the nonparametric test based on 
Mann-Whitney, I find significant evidence that one of the two samples tends to have 
higher values than the other for [0, 1] CARs around the proxy and for [-1, 0] around the 
meeting. The stock price reaction, one day after the proxy date and one day before the 
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shareholders meetings, tends to be more significant in proposals that do not won the 
majority of votes. The influence of the proposal outcome in the short-term cumulative 
return for [-1, 1] window is further analyzed below. Overall, I find evidence of a 
difference after the proxy date and before the meeting date. 
From the collected information about the proposals in the largest U.S. 
companies, I compare the cumulative abnormal returns in companies where not-for-
profit submitted proposals from the others. I do not find significant differences in mean 
and median in none of the estimated tests, t, z and U and I conclude that the stock price 
market reaction between the two groups is the same. The fact does not contradict the 
finding in Gillan and Starks (2000), that sponsored type of investors (individual and 
institutional) influence the CARs, because I do not consider all individual investor, only 
religious organizations. 
4. MULTIVARIATE ANALYSIS 
I now turn to multivariate models to analyze the voting outcome and stock market 
reaction of the proposals submitted by nonprofit institutions in 2009. For the voting 
outcome, I construct a linear regression model using as dependent variable the 
percentage of votes in favor at the shareholders meeting. Moreover, I use linear 
regression models to investigate the stock market reaction after the proxy date and after 
the meeting date. 
4.1. Analysis of voting outcome 
In order to analyze the voting outcome, the linear regression model tests the 
variables that influence the percentage of votes cast in favor of the proposals submitted 
by not-for-profit entities. 
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I start by using the following model: 
 
% votes in favor = f(valuation, profitability, growth, firm size, leverage and ownership 
structure, type of proposal) 
 
Financial characteristics are important factors to consider when studying the 
proposals’ effects. In fact, both Karpoff et al. (1996) and Ertimur et al. (2010) conclude 
that poorly financial performed companies attract proposals. I account, as Karpoff et al. 
(1996) and Thomas and Cotter (2007), for differences in valuation, profitability, growth, 
stock price returns, firm size, leverage and ownership structure. They use price-to-book 
ratio for appraise valuation. However, to value the target firm I use total assets (like 
Renneboog and Szilagyi 2011), return on assets and book-to-market ratio (as Ertimur et 
al. 2010), the ratio between book value and market value of equity (the product of price 
of the company’s common stock and common shares outstanding). The operating return 
on sales (or operating margin), evaluates the company’s operation efficiency and 
profitability and is measured as earnings before interest and taxes divided by sales. 
Earnings per share (EPS) growth rate, the compound annual rate of changes over the 
three years preceding the proposal year, and market capitalization, the logarithm of 




The ratio between assets and long-term debt is also considered by the model to 
assess leverage. I use as alternative for the leverage, as Renneboog and Szilagyi (2011), 
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the debt-to-equity ratio, the proportion of debt and equity that the company uses to 
finance assets, by dividing liabilities by book value of equity. Finally, in order to 
studying the ownership structure, I consider the percentage of insider and institutional 
ownership as indicators.
7
 This indicator tends to be one of the most influential of stock 
market and voting outcome, for example in Gillian and Starks (2000). Institutional 
ownership refers to the percentage of outstanding shares owned by investors and insider 
ownership concerns as the proportion of these shares held by insiders, that own 5% or 
more of them, for example by directors and managers of the firm. The financial data is 
obtained from Compustat monthly updated in North America for the fiscal year of 2009. 
By considering the financial characteristics of the companies where the non-for-
profit institutions submitted proposals during 2009, target firms, I obtain the descriptive 
statistics presented in Panel A of Table 8. Comparatively, Panel B presents the 
descriptive statistics of the firms where non-for-profit institutions did not submit 
proposals during 2009 (non-target firms). In order to compare the two groups I perform 
some tests, the results are shown in Table 9. In the parametric tests, Panel A, I conclude 
that the book-to-market ratio, return on assets, earnings per share growth and market 
capitalization means of target companies tend to be different than the other group. No 
significant differences are estimated in the other variables. In the non-parametric test, 
Panel B, I find significant differences between the financial values of target companies 
and non-target companies in sales, book-to-market ratio, return on assets, earnings per 
share growth and market capitalization. Therefore, I can conclude that not-for-profit 
entities tend to target companies with relatively similar financial characteristics as than 
the other shareholders. General nonprofit institutions tend to target companies with 
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 I use current data about ownership from money central website, because the historical is not available 
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higher valuation (book-to-market ratio), higher profitability relatively to assets owned 
(return on assets), higher profitability per unit of equity (EPS growth) and more 
valuable companies (higher market capitalization). Unlike Thomas and Cotter (2007) no 
difference in firm size is found. 
Next I compare the chosen financial indicators for two groups of companies 
with different voting outcomes. One group of companies, where the submitted proposals 
were approved during the year (obtaining more than fifty percent of the votes) and 
other, where this goal has not been achieved. Untabulated findings indicate that there 
are no differences in mean and median, between the approved and not approved 
proposals, for a ten percent of significance in parametric and non parametric tests in all 
the financial variables. 
Table 10 presents the results of estimating equation. In model 1, with the 
control variables that measure valuation (book-to-market), profitability (operating return 
on sales), growth (EPS growth rate), firm size (market capitalization), leverage and 
ownership structure (institutional and insider ownership), I use the dummy variables for 
the type of proposals: advisory vote, energy report, genetically products, health care, 
military sales and weapons in space. The variables take the value one if the proposal is 
related to each one of the issue and zero otherwise. Given the dimension of the sample, 
only thirty five observations, the other type of proposals is excluded from the model.
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For each one the six types of proposals I find significant evidence for different 
probability of being approved. The effect is positive for advisory compensation vote and 
negative for all the other issues addressed. In model 1 I also find that the percentage of 
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 When I include all the type of proposals’ dummy variables the significant effect of insider ownership is 
eliminated.  
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insider ownership is determinant for the percentage of votes in favor. Managers 
recommend shareholders for voting against almost all of the proposals, so it is evident 
that higher the percentage of insider shareholders lower is the percentage of vote in 
favor. 
In models 2, I use only the advisory vote type variable because half of the 
proposals are about this issue. I find that the proportion of votes is negatively related 
with insider ownership. The other variables related to valuation, profitability, growth, 
firm size and leverage fail to enter significantly in the regression. 
4.2.Analysis of abnormal returns 
The stock market reaction is evaluated by the cumulative abnormal returns for 
the event window [-1, 1] around the proxy and the meeting dates. Surrounding the two 
events the models try to explain the influence of several variables and type of proposals 
in the market reaction. 
The abnormal returns analysis uses the following model specification: 
 
CARs around proxy and meeting dates =  f(valuation, profitability, growth, stock price 
returns, firm size, leverage and ownership structure, type of proposal and majority vote) 
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Variables for valuation, profitability, growth, firm size, leverage and ownership 
structure are defined as above. Dummy variables for all type of proposals and majority 
vote are also included in the regression.
9
 
Table 11 and Table 12 exhibit the results of the regressions for market reactions, 
around the dates of proxy and meeting, respectively. In model 1 for both dependent 
variables, I look for the influence of the types of proposals also considering the 
variables for valuation, profitability, growth, firm size, leverage, ownership structure 
and majority vote. I find strictly differences between the effects of the issues addressed 
in the abnormal return around the two dates. Around proxy date, only proposals related 
to cumulative voting influence, negatively, the market reaction. Also proposals about 
credit card practices have evidence to significantly change the abnormal returns, 
negatively and equity compensation retention, positively. 
The proportion of institutional ownership influences negatively the abnormal 
return around both dates. Although this result is different from other studies, like 
Karpoff et al. (1996), where greater institutional ownership tends to increase the CARs 
around proxy date, the difference can be explained by the particular sponsor that I am 
considering, nonprofit entities. Institutional shareholders pressure firms to make 
organizational changes, but these issues are not the most representative type of the 
proposals submitted by nonprofit institutions. Besides affecting the voting outcome, the 
Insider ownership proportion also influences negatively the market reaction surrounding 
the meeting date, for the same reason. 
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 Majority vote’ dummy variable take two values: one if the proposals get more than fifty percent of the 
votes for and zero otherwise  
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Greater profitability, measured through operating return on sales and leverage, 
decrease the CARs around meeting and proxy dates. I conclude that market reaction to 
proposals in poor performance companies tends to be higher. Ertimur et al. (2010) 
consider that poorly performance are more likely to undergo significant governance 
changes. Also Gillian and Starks (2000) find that CARs are higher in poorly performing 
target companies with higher institutional ownership. As predicted, the majority vote 
influences the cumulative abnormal return specially around meeting date.  
In models 2, when I only include the dummy variables for types of proposals, I 
find evidence for proposals related to food insecurity in the regression of CARs around 
proxy date. This type of proposal tends to induce a lower market reaction around the 
date of announcement. 
5. CONCLUSIONS 
This paper highlights the significant number of non-for-profit institutions as 
active shareholders in the largest U.S. companies. It provides important information on 
the type of proposal, support and the entities involved. 
I have examined the voting outcome, the market reaction and all the indicators 
that influence them. I have shown some financial characteristics in the companies that 
receive proposals sponsored by these particular institutions and the others, discovering 
some differences, particularly in firms’ valuation and profitability. Insider ownership 
influences voting outcome significantly. The type of proposals also changes the likely 
of the proposals to be approved. I also find evidence for the impact of operating return 
on sales, leverage, valuation, majority vote and type of proposals in the cumulative 
abnormal returns. 
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My analysis and these empirical results have contributed to the previous studies 
about the discussing on shareholder activism, detailing the proposals submitted by non-
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TABLES 
Table 1 – Type of Proposals 
 
Proposals  # proposals  # NPIs  A NA  
Advisory vote on executive compensation  17  24  4  4  14  21  
Cumulative voting  1  1        1  1  
Death benefits   1  1        1  1  
Director expertise  1  1        1  1  
Equity compensation retention  1  1        1  1  
Executive stock retention  1  1        1  1  
Food insecurity  1  2        1  2  
Genetically engineered products  1  1        1  1  
Greenhouse gas reduction  2  2        2  2  
Health care principles  5  7        5  7  
Human rights policy  2  2        2  2  
Independent board chair  2  2        2  2  
Low carbon energy report  1  1        1  1  
Military sales to foreign governments  2  5        1  4  
Non addictive brands  1  3        1  3  
Political contributions and expenditures  4  4        4  4  
Predatory credit card lending practices  1  1        1  1  
Weapons in space  3  19        3  19  
Total 47  78  4  4  43  74  
Note: A= Approved, NA= Not approved 
 
Table 2 – List of Non-for-profit Institutions 
 
Non-for-profit Institutions  # proposals  A  NA 
Catholic Health East  2 
 
2 
Christian Brothers Investment Services  1 1 0 
Congregation of the Sisters of Charity of Incarnate Word  6 
 
6 
Congregation of Sisters of St. Agnes  5 
 
5 
General Board of Pension and Health Benefits of the United Methodist Church  2 
 
2 
(Glenmary) Home Missioners of America  1 1 0 
International Brotherhood of Teamsters General Fund  7 
 
7 
Mercy Investment Program  5 1 4 
Missionary Oblates of Mary Immaculate  2 
 
2 
Nathan Cummings Foundation  7 
 
7 
Province of St. Joseph of the Capuchin Order  2 
 
2 
School Sisters of Notre Dame Cooperative Investment Fund  2 
 
2 
Sisters of Charity of Saint Elizabeth  3 
 
3 
Sisters of Mercy of the Americas  2 
 
2 
Sisters of St. Francis of Philadelphia  4 
 
4 
St. Scholastica Monastery  2 
 
2 
Unitarian Universalist Association of Congregations  4 1 3 
 Total 57 4 53 






Table 3 – Percentage of votes for the proposal 
 
Proposals/ 
companies  AAPL  ALL  BAC  BMY  CCE  CL  CSCO  EMC  FCX  HON  KO  MCD  MCK  RTN  TWX  UNH  VLO  VZ  YUM  Mean  
Advisory 
vote  48  46     47  38  45  51  49     51  36  44     48  40  39  57     51  46  
 
Cumulative 
voting                                                     39     39  
 
Death 
benefits                                       49.97                    50  
 
Director 




retention                                      30                    30  
 
Independent 
board chair                                29                          29  
 
Political 




practices        33                                                33  
Total 32  46  33  47  38  45  51  49  32  51  33  44  40  48  40  39  48  39  51  33  
 
Table 4 – Cumulative abnormal returns – descriptive statistics 
 
Variable N Minimum Maximum Mean Median St. Deviation 
Panel A: Around proxy date       
CAR window [-1,0] 35 -0.061 0.136 0.009 0.004 0.040 
CAR window [-1,1] 35 -0.048 0.295 0.013 0.002 0.058 
CAR window [0,1] 35 -0.050 0.275 0.012 0.003 0.053 
 
Panel B: Around meeting date 
      
CAR window [-1,0] 35 -0.084 0.055 -0.003 -0.002 0.030 
CAR window [-1,1] 35 -0.098 0.133 -0.005 -0.002 0.036 










Table 5 – CARs mean by type of proposal 
 
Type of proposal Proxy date Meeting date 
Advisory vote 0.003 -0.009 
Cumulative voting -0.015 -0.051 
Death benefits 0.002 -0.006 
Director expertise -0.048 -0.015 
Equity compensation retention -0.005 -0.008 
Executive stock retention 0.002 -0.006 
Food insecurity -0.017 -0.032 
Genetically Products 0.018 0.010 
Greenhouse gas emissions -0.029 -0.023 
Health care principles 0.065 0.013 
Human rights 0.006 -0.021 
Independent board chairman 0.013 -0.031 
Low carbon energy report 0.03 -0.010 
Military sales to foreign  governments -0.004 0.011 
Non addictive brands -0.017 -0.032 
Political contributions and expenditures -0.003 -0.006 
Predatory credit card lending practices 0.054 -0.031 
Weapons in space 0.037 0.007 
 
Table 6 – CARs by proposal outcome – descriptive statistics 
 
                           Proposal won the majority 
 Yes No 
Variable N Min Max Mean St. 
Dev 
N Min Max Mean St. 
Dev 
Panel A: Around proxy date 
 
       
CAR  
window [-1,0] 
4 -0.035 0.030 0.006 0.030 31 -0.061 0.136 0.009 0.042 
CAR  
window [-1,1] 
4 -0.030 0.010 -0.008 0.017 31 -0.048 0.295 0.016 0.061 
CAR 
 window [0,1] 
 
4 -0.050 0.005 -0.023
*
 0.025 31 -0.033 0.275 0.017
*
 0.055 
Panel B: Around meeting date 
  
       
CAR   
window [-1,0] 
4 -0.084 -0.005 -0.045 0.039 31 -0.062 0.055 0.002 0.024 
CAR  
window [-1,1] 
4 -0.098 0.000 -0.038 0.047 31 -0.051 0.133 -0.001 0.034 
CAR  
window [0,1] 
4 -0.051 0.011 -0.011 0.028 31 -0.042 0.102 0.000 0.026 
Note: *, ** and *** denote significance at 10, 5 and 1% level, respectively. 
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Table 7 – CARs around proxy date by proposal outcome – statistic tests 
 








Panel A: Around proxy date   
[-1,0] -0.129 0.898 -0.168 0.867 0.512 0.646 68 0.776 




 0.054 45 0.392 
[0,1] -1.406 0.169 -2.496
**
 0.013 0.203 0.214 23
**
 0.046 










 0.054 -1.529 0.126 1.967 0.28 37 0.204 
[0,1] -1.406 0.169 -0.748 0.455 1.134 0.702 56 0.776 
Note: *, ** and *** denote significance at 10, 5 and 1% level, respectively. 
 
Table 8 – Descriptive statistics of financial characteristics 
 
  N Minimum Maximum Mean St. Deviation 
Panel A: Target firms      
Assets 35 7148 2223299 119282.961 370743.542 
Sales/Turnover (Net) 35 10868 275564 50726.326 54392.943 
Debt-to-Equity ratio 35 -30.908 26.889 2.524 7.862 
Market value of equity 35 9097.446 322334.13 57817.859 62268.703 
Book-to-market ratio 35 -5.170 17.669 3.993 4.459 
Operating return on Sales 35 0.003 0.438 0.157 0.107 
Return on assets 35 -0.056 0.341 0.076 0.072 
EPS growth rate 35 -1.852 0.575 -0.16 0.515 
Market Capitalization 35 3.959 5.508 4.582 0.391 
Leverage 35 0.000 32.729 6.953 6.094 
Institutional ownership 35 48.47% 94.8% 72.915% 11.027% 
5%/Insider Ownership  35 0% 24.88% 2.579% 4.957% 
      
Panel B: Non-target firms      
Assets  105 4428.614 2031989 108894.306 267219.708 
Sales/Turnover (Net) 105 7011.383 406103 36065.603 47648.662 
Debt-to-Equity ratio 105 -18.301 17.664 2.796 3.848 
Market value of equity 105 1772.054 211743.16 41726.979 50958.041 
Book-to-market ratio 105 -6.180 14.799 2.502 2.364 
Operating return on Sales 105 -1.149 0.512 0.118 0.183 
Return on assets 105 -0.219 0.272 0.040 0.068 
EPS growth rate 105 -2.924 0.370 -0.395 0.743 
Market Capitalization 105 3.248 5.326 4.367 0.471 
Leverage 105 0 6008.974 65.463 585.793 
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Table 9  – Statistics tests for type of entity 
 
 Panel A: Parametric tests t  p- 
value 
(bil) 
z  p-value 
(bil) 
F  p-value  
(bil) 
Assets  0.153 0.879 0.153 0.878 1.925
**
 0.012 
Sales/Turnover (Net) 1.521 0.131 1.423 0.155 1.303 0.312 
Debt-to-Equity ratio -0.197 0.845 -0.197 0.844 4.175
***
 <0.0001 








Operating return on Sales 1.541 0.126 1.541 0.123 0.345
***
 0.001 




 0.008 1.132 0.621 











 0.007 0.689 0.216 
Leverage -1,023 0.309 -1.023 0.306 0.000 < 0.0001 




Assets  2127 0.164   
Sales/Turnover (Net) 2312
**
 0.023   
Debt-to-Equity ratio 1722 0.580   
Market value of equity 2344 0.015   
Book-to-market ratio 2234
*
 0.057   
Operating return on Sales 2123 0.170   
Return on assets 2351
**
 0.014   
EPS growth rate 2294
**
 0.028   
Market Capitalization 2344
**
 0.015   
Leverage 1855 0.821   



















Table 10 – Models explaining the percentage of votes in favor 
 
   Model 1 Model 2 
 Exp sign Coefficient t-statistic Coefficient t-statistic 
Intercept   0.706
**
 2.231 0.234 0.491 





Energy Report -  -0.179
**
 -2.755   
Genetically Products - -0.219
***
 -3.375   
Health Care -  -0.232
***
 -6.491   
Military Sales - -0.262
***
 -4.663   
Weapons in Space - -0.247
***
 -5.224   
Book-to-market - 0.001 0.260 -0.007 -1.519 
Operating return on Sales - -0.050 -0.383 0.143 0.609 
EPS growth rate - 0.006 0.265 -0.045 -1.161 
Market Capitalization - -0.057 -1.213 0.003 0.044 
Leverage - 0.001 0.256 0.004 1.193 
Institutional ownership  + -0.172 -0.972 -0.122 -0.480 





Number of observations  35  35  
R
2 
 0.919  0.645  



























Table 11 – Models explaining abnormal returns around the proxy date 
 
   Model 1 Model 2 
 Exp sign Coefficient t-statistic Coefficient t-statistic 





Book-to-market - -0.004 -1.632   
Operating return on sales - -0.449
*
 -2.179   
EPS growth rate - 0.040 1.535   
Market Capitalization - -0.034 -0.698   
Leverage - -0.006
**
 -2.292   
Institutional ownership - -0.447
**
 -2.667   
5%/Insider Ownership - -0.239 -0.688   
Majority Vote - -0.050 -1.499   
Advisory Vote   -0.010 -0.228 -0.064 -1.578 
Credit Card Practices   -0.002 -0.028 -0.010 -0.134 
Cumulative Voting   -0.175
**
 -2.466 -0.080 -1.068 
Death Benefits   -0.056 -0.857 -0.062 -0.835 
Director Expertise   0.013 0.146 -0.112 -1.502 
Energy Report   -0.026 -0.395 -0.034 -0.460 
Equity Compensation Retention   0.047 0.464 -0.005 -0.077 
Food Insecurity   -0.042 -0.548 -0.135
*
 -1.909 
Genetically Products   -0.044 -0.654 -0.047 -0.627 
Greenhouse Emissions   -0.051 -0.726 -0.086 -1.479 
Health Care   0.003 0.081 0.053 1.319 
Independent Board  Chairman   -0.011 -0.239 -0.019 -0.387 
Military Sales   -0.078 -1.287 -0.068 -1.110 
Political Contributions   -0.062 -1.526 -0.014 -0.373 
Weapons in Space  0.022 0.429 -0.028 -0.493 
Number of observations  35   35  
R
2 
 0.780   0.396  















Table 12 – Models explaining abnormal returns around the meeting date 
  Model 1 Model 2 




 2.026 0.024 0.782 
Book-to-market - 0.000 0.195   
Operating return on sales - -0.300
**
 -2.636   
EPS growth rate - 0.009 0.594   
Market Capitalization - -0.006 -0.239   
Leverage - -0.004
***
 -3.256   
Institutional ownership - -0.258
**
 -2.791   
5%/Insider Ownership  - -0.539
**
 -2.812   
Majority Vote - -0.054
**
 -2.897   
Advisory Vote   -0.021 -0.892 -0.032 -1.122 
Credit Card Practices   -0.090
*
 -2.077 -0.054 -1.053 
Cumulative Voting   -0.148
***
 -3.779 -0.075 -1.453 
Death Benefits   -0.041 -1.148 -0.029 -0.569 
Director Expertise   0.017 0.358 -0.039 -0.756 
Energy Report   -0.049 -1.371 -0.034 -0.649 
Equity Compensation Retention   0.129
**
 2.313 0.000 -0.004 
Food Insecurity   -0.056 -1.343 -0.072 -1.473 
Genetically Products   -0.044 -1.172 -0.014 -0.268 
Greenhouse Emissions   -0.008 -0.214 -0.023 -0.571 
Health Care   -0.006 -0.292 0.017 0.593 
Independent Board Chairman   -0.026 -1.074 -0.039 -1.128 
Military Sales   -0.060 -1.777 -0.013 -0.306 
Political Contributions   -0.034 -1.543 -0.008 -0.317 
Weapons in Space  0.000 -0.002 -0.016 -0.421 
Number of observations  35  35  
R
2 
 0.830  0.265  
Note: *, ** and *** denote significance at 10, 5 and 1% level, respectively. 
 
